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Abstract 
The formulation and implementation of effective coordination strategy among members is key to promote sustainable development 
of Green Supply Chain (GSC). Combining with the specific situation, this paper establishes the product utility diversity model and 
supply chain revenue model based on custom market demand caused by green products' utility diversity, and examines the 
coordination between manufactures and its upstream suppliers under Stackelberg game and cooperative decision-making 
respectively, resulting to two pricing strategies as well as market conditions for GSC to operate regularly. In addition, formulating 
coordination pricing strategy of the wholesale price based on cooperative decision-making strategy achieves the members' 
Stackelberg equilibrium profits Pareto improvement. We conclude the results of crucial significances for collaboration of members 
who promote the initial GSC and for the development of green market. 
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1. Introduction 
Green supply chain is a modern management model which has an comprehensive consideration of the efficiency of 
resources allocation and environmental impact [1]. The model requires to make the product environmentally 
compatibly in its whole life cycle. Whether the coordination strategy of GSC's members is reasonable and operational 
is one of the key points for supply system to work efficiently. With the emerging of green market, successful operation 
of supply chain is determined not only by the quality of green products and coordination and cooperation and income 
distribution of its members, but also the strength of the driving force to the green products affected by consumer 
market [2]. Therefore, with respect to China's practical situation, herein comes the contexts of the research. That is, 
how to pricing reasonably (including sales prices of manufactures' green products and wholesale price of the upstream 
suppliers' intermediated products) for customers to choose green products in view of utility maximization. 
Relevant research literature can be divided into two parts. One part considered the supply chain members' 
coordination strategy formulation in terms of the compatibility of enterprise behavior environment. Berna (2002) came 
to the conclusion that reasonable and effective coordination strategy would improve GSC's operational performance by 
making empirical analysis in view of optimum distribution of resources within the system [3]. Vachon (2006) figured 
out that there's a close relationship between the effectiveness of pollution prevention and the degree of supply chain 
members' collaboration [4]. Koplin (2007) raised two coordination methods among members to put forward the 
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sustainable development of supply chain based on different social responsibilities [5]. Sheu (2011) examined the 
function of government policies to promote coordination and collaboration of various supply chain members through 
the study of electronic industry in Taiwan [6]. The other part of the research emphasized the influences on supply 
chain members' decision-making made by green market's demands. Wang (2007) developed a quantification model to 
make an extensive research of the relationship between market demands and the operation of GSC [7]. Cao (2007) 
explained that marketing requirements becomes the drives of the green supply chain [8]. Vachon (2008) pointed out 
that on the market demand uncertainty case, manufacturers and upstream suppliers would obtain more benefits when 
paying attention to green environmental cooperation with respect to market demand uncertainty [9]. 
In terms of the two-echelon GSC system which consists of one manufacture and various suppliers, the paper 
examines their different pricing behaviors based on Stackelberg game and cooperative decision-making under the 
condition that different consumers have diverse utilities on the same green product, and puts forward the required 
market conditions for GSC to operate regularly. Besides, the paper brings forward a coordination strategy of the 
wholesale price of suppliers based on cooperative decision-making. The results of the study have a guiding 
significance and reference value for the pricing of the supply chain in the early form of green market and for the 
reasonable revenue allocation. 
2. Backgrounds 
With the development of economic and continuous improvement of people's living standards, consumers have 
growing interests on green products. Actually, the same green product may bring different utilities to different 
customers, that is, green products have utility diversity. We assume that T  represents the satisfaction of different 
customers obtained from the same green product. [ , ]T T T , T  represents the lowest satisfaction when customers 
think green products and normal goods are alike, and T  represents the highest degree of satisfaction, such consumers 
have extreme preference for green products. To facilitate the analysis, we suppose that T is subject to uniform 
distribution in [ , ]T T . Mp  is deemed as sales price of green products (the price is determined by manufacturers alone 
as we ignored the pricing effect of downstream vendors) while 0p  is deemed as the price of normal goods, k 
represents satisfaction cost coefficient which reflects the cost that consumers are willing to pay to improve one unit of 
satisfaction, k>0. Obviously, ș-typed consumers would buy the green products when 0 ( ) Mp k pT T  t . In a result, 
we can estimate the critical satisfaction *T  by using the equation *0 ( ) Mp k pT T   , it equals to 
 * 0Mp p kT T                   (1) 
Assuming that the capacity of the consumer market is 1 and the market demand of green products is q ( [0,1]q ) , 
and 
0 01 11 1 1
( ) ( ) ( )
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T T T T T T T T

        
   ³       (2) 
where 01 [ ( )]T T  a p k , 1 [ ( )]T T b k , then we can see a linear inverse relationship between sales of green 
products and their prices. It is worth mentioning that, 0 0[ , ( )]T T  Mp p p k  as [0,1]q , 0!k  and 
( ) 0T T ! . That is, the sales price of green products is within a certain range, and this is consistent with reality. 
In addition, it is assumed that there is one manufacture and n upstream suppliers who provide the same 
intermediated green products. 
iS
c , 
iS
q  and 
iS
p  represent supplier i's marginal cost of intermediated green goods, 
order quantity and wholesale price respectively. These products are proposed to be homogeneous (similar and 
substitutable) in the paper, thus, leading to the same wholesale price of intermediate goods provided by suppliers, 
1
     
i nS S S S
p p p p . Meanwhile, if a single green product contains a single green intermediate goods, then the 
order quantity of green intermediate goods is equal to the market demand of green products, 
1 
 ¦ j
n
S
j
q q . Mc  is 
defined as marginal costs of green products, !S Sp c , ! M S Mp p c . Besides, 
         *0 0 0M S M S M M Sk p c c k p c c p c cT T T T    t        !  should be satisfied. Otherwise, the entire green 
supply chain cannot work as neither manufacturers nor suppliers are willing to offer green products. 
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Furthermore, we obtained the manufacture's revenue function SM  and supplier i's revenue function S iS  as 
follows, 
( ) ( )( )M M S M M S Mp p c q p p c a bqS                 (3) 
( )
i i iS S S S
p c qS                  (4) 
3. Pricing model of GSC based on Stackelberg game 
Assuming that the green market is just emerging (this is consistent with the actual situation), the upstream suppliers 
of the supply chain is still in the status of the buyer's market, and the suppliers make decisions first (see wholesale 
price
iS
p and order quantity 
iS
q as decision variables), then the manufacturer follows (see the sales price of green 
products Mp  as the decision variable). Thus, we achieved the typical Stackelberg game [10,11]. It should be noted 
that in the case of public knowledge of 
iS
c , the game among various suppliers is in line with the characteristics of 
Cournot model [10,12] under symmetric information static game. 
We use backward induction [10] to analyze the model, and the manufacturer's decision behavior comes first. Take 
partial derivative of Mp , and we achieve the optimal first-order conditions as follows, 
2 ( ) 0M M M M Sp bp a b c pSw w                 (5) 
and 
1 ( )
2M S M
ap p c
b
        (6) 
> @1 ( )
2 S M
q a b p c        (7) 
Then we have the suppliers' decision behavior by combining Eq.(7) and 
1 
 ¦ j
n
S
j
q q , 
1
2
j
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b b  
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Plug it into Eq.(4), and we have 
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then we obtain supplier i's optimal first-order condition, 
1
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     (10) 
We imagine that different 
iS
c  will bring about different 
iS
q , so we can get every 
iS
q  based on Eq.(10). Now we 
simplify the situation by considering that 
1
     
i nS S S S
c c c c , then there comes 
1
     
i nS S S S
q q q q . 
With respect to Eq.(10), we have 
2 [( 1) ] 0M S S
a c c n q
b b
                 (11) 
and 
1 [ ( )]
2( 1)
ST
S M Sq a b c cn
  

     (12) 
where ST represents the equilibrium solution of Stackelberg game, next we obtain another three equations, 
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Take partial derivative of n with respect to STSp and 
ST
Mp  respectively, noting that   0T T  a b k p , we have 
2
0( 1) { [ ( ) ]} 0
ST
S
M S
p n c c k p
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w
     (17) 
Conclusion 1: On the condition that upstream supplier plays the role of plot while the manufacture follows, the 
order quantity of green intermediated products provided by each supplier sq , the wholesale price of green 
intermediated products Sp  and sales price of green products Mp  will have a decline while the total order quantity 
of manufacturers q will increase as the number of suppliers n grows. Thus, we conclude that the growth of the number 
of suppliers is beneficial to customers. 
Furthermore, we can obtain the revenue of manufacturer S STM , the revenue of each supplier S
ST
S  and the total 
revenue of the supply chain S STT  under Stackelberg game as follows, 
2
2
2 [ ( )]( 1) 4
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M M S
n b a c c
n b
S    

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          (20) 
4. Pricing model of GSC based on cooperative decision-making 
In this Section we estimate pricing strategy of GSC under cooperative decision-making. We have the total revenue 
ST  expressed as follows, 
( ) ( ) ( )T M S M S M s S S M M Sn p p c q n p c q p c c qS S S              (21) 
According to optimal first-order conditions 0Sw w  T Mp  and   Mq a bp , we have 
* 1 ( )
2M M S
ap c c
b
                 (22) 
where * represents the optimal solution, then we have 
* 1 [ ( )]
2 M S
aq b c c
b
        (23) 
* 2[ ( )]
4T M S
b a c c
b
S         (24) 
Suppose * 2( ) ( 2) ( 1)STT TT n n n nS S    , and we can arrive at the conclusions below after referring to Eq.(16), 
Eq.(17), Eq.(18) and Eq.(22). 
Conclusion 2: The relationship between the number of suppliers n and the revenue of supply chain is showed as 
follows, 
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x The total revenue of GSC based on cooperative decision-making *TS is unrelated to the number of suppliers n 
x On the Stackelberg game condition, both total revenue STTS and manufacturer's revenue 
ST
MS  increase with the 
increase of n while suppliers' revenue STSS  decline. Furthermore, the proportion of all revenues under Stackelberg 
game with respect to the total revenue *TS  under cooperative decision-making is only associated with n  
x With respect to lim ( ) 1
n
T n
of
 , with the growth of n, STTS  constantly approaches to
*
TS . 
5. Further discussion of relations between relevant parameters of consumer market and GSC’S operation  
According to the contextual framework in Section 2, the GSC can only work properly when the sales price 
satisfies 0 0[ , ( )]T T  Mp p p k . Combining 01 [ ( )]T T  a p k , 1 [ ( )]T T b k  with Eq.(15) and Eq.(23), we 
can draw a conclusion. 
Conclusion 3: To ensure the normal operation of GSC, it should satisfy the condition 0( ) ( )T T !  M Sk c c p  
when members set a price based on cooperative decision-making. On the other hand, when pricing based on 
Stackelberg game, there comes to two cases, 
x if 0 tM Sc c p , 0( ) ( )T T !  M Sk c c p  should be satisfied 
x if 0 M Sc c p , 0( ) [ ( )] ( 2)T T !   M Sk n p c c n  should be satisfied. 
In the consumer market, we can assume that the related parameters of normal goods 0p and T  are constant. 
According to Conclusion 3, regular operation of GSC is not only determined by the number of upstream suppliers n, 
marginal production costs of manufacturers Mc  and marginal production costs of suppliers cS , but also determined 
by the customers’ satisfaction cost coefficient k and the highest satisfaction coefficient of consumers T . In other 
words, only when ( )T Tk  is within a certain range, the GSC can be formed. 
Next, we have an intensive discussion of the relationship between some relevant parameters and revenue of the 
supply chain. First of all, plug 01 [ ( )]T T  a p k , 1 [ ( )]T T b k  into 
*ST , and we can see 
* 2
0
1 [ ( ) ( )]
4 ( )T M S
k p c c
k
S T T
T T
    

          (25) 
where S   T K , we have 
2 2 2 2( 1) , 2 ( 1) , ( 2) ( 1)S S S      ST ST STM S TKn n K n Kn n n . Seen from the above, we 
deem 0p  and T  as constants as it's under the operation of GSC. At the same time, S STM , S STS , S STT and *ST  will 
have a decline as either suppliers' marginal production costs Sc  or manufacturer's marginal production costs Mc  
grows. Following we can explain the effect of k and T  on the revenue of the GSC. 
Take partial derivative of k, and referring to Conclusion 3, we have 
*
2 2
02
1 {[ ( ) [( ) ] } 0
4 ( )
T
M Sk c c pk k
S T T
T T
w      !
w 
        (26) 
Conclusion 4: With the rise of satisfaction cost coefficient k (which means consumers are willing to pay more to 
improve satisfaction when buying green products), S T  will have a growth accordingly, and so will S
ST
M ,S
ST
S  and 
S STT  under Stackelberg game. 
Take partial derivative of T  in Eq.(25),  
*
2 2
0
1 {[ ( )] [( ) ] } 0
4 ( )
T
M Sk c c pk
S T T
T T T
w      !
w 
        (27) 
Conclusion 5: With the rise of the highest satisfaction T  (customers receive higher satisfaction by purchasing 
green products), S T  will have a growth accordingly, and so will S
ST
M ,S
ST
S  and S
ST
T . 
6. Coordination pricing strategy model of GSC 
Although the participation of multiple vendors is beneficial for manufacturers as well as total gains of GSC, 
manufacturers will have few suppliers to provide green intermediate products as they'd like to reduce management 
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costs and operational risks. Therefore, as for a certain kind of green intermediate product, manufacturers usually have a 
limited number of suppliers as partners, for instance 1 to 4. The following description of revenue allocation among 
manufacturers and suppliers under cooperative decision-making is not only complied with all members’ rational 
requirements (the pursuit of their own utility maximization) but also targeted on increasing the overall revenue of 
GSC. In other words, determining the wholesale price of green intermediate products Sp  to let ST  approach to 
*ST  
and making Pareto improvement of SM and S S . Now we use another two coordination pricing strategy to determine 
Sp  when the number of upstream suppliers remains n. 
6.1. A linear coordination pricing strategy based on bargaining power 
Under cooperative strategy, we have * ( ) 2  M M Sp a b c c ,
* [ ( )] 2  M Sq b a b c c .In order to make Pareto 
improvement of both sides' gains under Stackelberg equilibrium solution, S St STM M  and S St
ST
S S  should be 
satisfied, expressed as 
2
* *
2( ) ( 1)M M S
np c p q K
n
  t

             (28) 
*
2
2( )
( 1)S S
qp c K
n n
 t

              (29) 
Then we find min max[ , ]S S Sp p p  and 
2
min 2
1 [ ( 1) ]
( 1)S M S
ap n nc n n c
n b
    

          (30) 
2
max 2
1 [(2 1) (2 1) (2 2 1) ]
2( 1)S M S
ap n n c n n c
n b
      

       (31) 
Obviously, manufacturers hope to reach minoS Sp p  while suppliers want maxoS Sp p  on the other hand. Suppose 
that LSp  represents the wholesale price of suppliers based on liner pricing strategy, O  and (1 )O n  represent the 
bargaining power of manufactures and suppliers respectively (we deem that the negotiating abilities of all suppliers are 
the same). When [0,1]O  , the wholesale price of green intermediate product can be expressed as follows, 
min max min max 2
(1 ) 2 1[ ] (1 ) [ ( )]
2( 1)
L
S S S S S M S S
n ap p n p p p c c c
n n b
O OO O O          

 (32) 
6.2. Nonlinear coordination pricing strategy under Nash bargaining model 
For multiplayer consultations, Nash have discussed multiplayer negotiations, and proposed the famous Nash 
bargaining solutions [13], Harsanyi and Selten worked on the basis of Nash's research and figured out non-optimal 
Nash bargaining solutions [14], 
i
i
n
i
in dxuxuxu
O))((maxarg))(,),((
1
**
1   
  
      
    
* *
1 1
* *
1
, , , ,
. .
, ,
­ t°
®
°¯
 

n n
n
u x u x d d
s t
u x u x S
          (33) 
where  iu x is the utility function of decision-maker i, id represents the starting points of negotiation, S represents 
the negotiation domain ,and iO  represents the negotiation capability of decision-maker i, 
1
1O
 
 ¦
n
i
i
. In this model, 
Both manufacturers and suppliers are thought risk-neutral. While the starting points of manufacturer and suppliers are 
S STM  and S
ST
S  separately, the negotiation abilities are O  and (1 )O n . On the basis of non-optimal Nash 
bargaining solutions, we post the objective function of nonlinear coordination pricing model ( )SE p , 
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1 *
* 1
2 2
2 1 2( ) ( ) [( ) ] [ ( ) ] [( ) ]
( 1) ( 1)
ST ST nn
S M M S S S S S S
n qE p K p c q p c K
n n n
O
O O OS S S S

       
 
 (34) 
When ( ) / 0 S SdE p dp , the function can be arranged as 
2
2 1 [ ( )]
2( 1)
NL
S M S S
n ap c c c
n b
O    

           (35) 
where NLSp  represents the wholesale price under nonlinear pricing strategy. 
6.3. Further discussion of coordination pricing strategy 
We find the result interesting when comparing Eq.(32) with Eq.(35), noting that  L NLS Sp p  (it is a special case as 
the satisfaction-density function  Tf subjects to uniform distribution). Suppose *  L NLS S Sp p p , and *Sp  is the 
wholesale price of green intermediate goods of suppliers, then we come to the following conclusion. 
Conclusion 6: Given the model framework, the wholesale prices of suppliers got from liner coordination pricing 
strategy and nonlinear coordination pricing strategy are the same ( i.e. *Sp ). Given the certain number of upstream 
suppliers n, we find that it is linearly inverse between *Sp  and negotiation ability coefficient O  but linear 
proportional between *Sp  and marginal production costs cS . 
To give a straightforward idea of the problem, we make use of numerical simulation, discussing the changes of all 
kinds of gains of GSC on the basis of Stackelberg game and the above coordination strategy separately. 
Example 1: Suppose that 0T  , 2T  , 1 k , 0 1.5 p , 2 n , 1 Mc , 2 Sc . Fig.1 (a), (b) and (c) illustrate the 
changes of the revenue of all members and the whole GSC based on both two pricing strategy when O  is in the range 
of 0 to 1. 
Fig.1 shows that *S St STM M , 
*S St STS S  and 
*S St STT T  when > @0,1O  . Fig.1. (a) shows when 0O  , *S S STM M  
and with the growth of the negotiation ability of manufacturersO , *SM  increases. On the other hand, when 1O  , 
*S S STS S . The negotiation ability of suppliers is the weakest then, but as O  declines, 
*S S  will rise continuously. 
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 (a) Revenue comparison between manufactures and suppliers    (b) Comparison of total revenue of GSC 
Fig. 1. Relationship between O  and revenue of GSC under different pricing strategies 
Conclusion 7: Given the certain model framework, when the wholesale price of green intermediate 
products * 2[ ( )](2 1 ) [2( 1) ]O      S M S Sp a b c c n n c , gains of both manufacturers and suppliers would achieve 
Pareto improvement, and make the total profits of supply chain optimal. 
7. Conclusion 
The foundation of proper coordination relationship among members is of vital importance to decrease costs, to 
accelerate reaction to market changes, thus improving the system's overall competitive advantage. The paper examines 
the pricing and coordination strategy of both green products and its intermediate goods on the conditions that 
customers show different preferences for various green goods and one certain kind of green product has utility 
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diversity among consumers. After putting forward the green products' utility diversity equation and revenue model of 
the supply chain, the paper analyzes the revenue of GSC under Stackelberg game and cooperative decision-making 
separately, discusses the basic conditions for GSC's regular operation, and figures out the coordination pricing strategy 
on the basis of cooperative decision-making. This strategy not only achieves the members' profits Pareto improvement, 
but also maximize the total revenue of GSC, therefore ensuring highly-operation of GSC. The ideas and results were 
significant and valuable for decision-making of GSC's operation on the initial stage of green market. 
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